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SEC v. UNIFUND SAL: A THAW IN THE
SEC's USE OF THE ASSET FREEZE TO
PROSECUTE OFFSHORE FRAUD
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 3, 1990, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit (Second Circuit) handed down a decision in
SEC v. Unifund SAL,' partly vacating and modifying a prelimi-
nary injunction and freeze order issued by the Southern District
Court of New York,2 which may turn out to be a significant set-
back to the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) efforts
to enforce United States insider trading laws against foreign in-
vestors in the United States securities markets. In the decision,
the Second Circuit ruled that a freeze ordered on the foreign
defendant's United States-based brokerage accounts3 was only
proper for a "brief interval," and that in view of the time which
had passed since the injunction was issued (over five months),4
the freeze order would expire in thirty days from the date of the
court's mandate5 unless the SEC advised the district court
within that time that it was ready for trial.
6
Although the decision may prove to be helpful in some re-
spects to the SEC in future civil enforcement actions,7 the time
1. 910 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1990), reh'g denied 917 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1990).
2. SEC v. Foundation Hal, 736 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); the published opinion
contains a spelling error: the correct spelling of that defendant's name appears to be
"Fondation Hal."
3. The allegedly illegal trades were made through these accounts.
4. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) obtained a Temporary Re-
straining Order on January 17, 1990, which included an order freezing the defendants'
accounts. Unifund, 910 F.2d at 1030. The preliminary injunctions against appellants
Unifund SAL and Tamanaco Saudi & Gulf Investment Group were granted on March 1
and February 14, respectively. Id. at 1030-31.
5. The court's mandate ordinarily issues 21 days after the decision, so the SEC ef-
fectively had 51 days within which to declare its readiness for trial. Response of Unifund
SAL to Securities and Exchange Commission's Petition for Rehearing at 2, SEC v.
Unifund SAL, No. 90-6093 (2d Cir. Sept. 20, 1990) [hereinafter Unifund's Response].
6. Unifund, 910 F.2d at 1043.
7. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Second Circuit) affirmed the dis-
trict court's finding of personal jurisdiction over defendant Unifund (Tamanaco did not
appeal the district court's finding of jurisdiction), allowed the asset freeze to cover possi-
ble treble penalties as well as disgorgement, and accepted a "meager showing on the
merits" as sufficient for the initial imposition of the asset freeze. The court also rejected
the rule previously advanced by the courts of the Second Circuit that the SEC must
satisfy a higher burden on the merits in seeking a preliminary injunction than private
litigants. Id. at 1042-43. See also infra notes 110-11.
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limit imposed by the Second Circuit on the asset freeze order
may put an end to an aggressive strategy employed by the SEC
in cases of suspected inside trading by foreign entities.8 This
new strategy, as evidenced by Unifund and several other "un-
known purchaser" actions brought recently by the SEC,9 is to
seek injunctive relief ° in federal court immediately following ev-
idence of uncommonly large purchases of a company's securities
- usually in the form of call options - by a small number of
individuals or entities in the days or weeks preceding the public
release of material information relating to that company.1
In cases involving foreign defendants in particular, the SEC
also seeks the ancillary remedy of freezing any proceeds, unliqui-
dated securities, or unexercised options which remain in the
United States brokerage accounts through which the trades were
made. 2 The SEC usually justifies its request for a freeze order
8. See Remedies Bill Will Not Change Policy on Enforcement, DAILY REP. FOR EX-
ECUTIVEs (BNA) No. 156, at A-5 (Aug. 13, 1990) ("[T]he commission has stepped up its
'unknown purchaser'-type cases," (quoting Gary Lynch, a former SEC Enforcement Di-
rector)) [hereinafter Remedies Bill].
See also Foust & Galen, The Crackdown on Insiders Abroad, Bus. Wx., Aug. 27,
1990, at 74.
9. See, e.g., SEC v. Heider, 90 Civ. No. 4636 (CSH) (S.D.N.Y. filed July 20, 1990),
SEC Litigation Release No. 12556 (July 20, 1990), 1990 SEC LEXIS 2692, an enforce-
ment action initiated against known and unknown foreign purchasers of Contel securities
only one day after GTE Corporation announced its offer to acquire Contel for $6.2 bil-
lion and only several days after the alleged fraudulent purchases were made. See also
infra notes 20-33 and accompanying text (Section 11A).
10. Pursuant to section 21(d) of The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C.
78u (1988).
11. In seeking injunctive relief in such cases the SEC usually seeks an injunction
which: (1) enjoins future violations of the insider trading laws; (2) enjoins the destruction
or alteration of the defendants' books and records; and (3) freezes the accounts contain-
ing the proceeds of the defendants' trades. See, e.g., SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028,
1029 (2d Cir. 1990).
The SEC also frequently seeks asset freezes where the defendant is in the United
States, in order to prevent the defendant from moving the funds offshore. See, e.g., SEC
v. Worden, 90 Civ. No. 1790 (LBS) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 1990).
12. Two recent cases in the United Kingdom, Derby & Co. v. Weldon, 2 W.L.R. 412
(C.A. 1988), and Securities & Inva. Bd. v. Pantell S.A., 3 W.L.R. 698 (Ch. 1989), involve
the even more controversial practice of freezing the extraterritorial assets of individuals
under a court's jurisdiction. In Derby (Donaldson, M.R.), the court, facing the possibility
that the defendants might dissipate their assets before any potential judgment in favor
of the plaintiff, held that the court could impose a freeze extending to overseas assets
under extraordinary circumstances. 2 W.L.R. at 423.
In Pantell, the Vice-Chancellor provided for an asset freeze extending to a bank
account in Guernsey. 3 W.L.R. at 704. The freeze was imposed with a lengthy and some-
what confusing proviso taken from the opinion of Donaldson, M.R. in Derby 2 W.L.R. at
429, which appeared to assure the foreign jurisdictions that the orders would not have
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by pointing to attempts by the defendant to move assets out of
the United States, and by appealing to the "inherent equitable
power" of the court to protect a party's ability to obtain mean-
ingful relief.13 Ultimately, in such civil enforcement actions the
SEC is seeking a permanent injunction against violation of the
securities laws and an order of disgorgement of the profits the
defendants derived from their illegal trades. 4
The imposition of an asset freeze is a crucial step toward
that goal. Without it, foreign defendants are highly likely to just
"take the money and run,"' leaving no funds in the United
States for the SEC to attach in the event of default. In addition,
effect in those jurisdictions without local sanction, while at the same time specifically
providing that the order would be enforceable against the Guernsey branch of an English
bank. Pantell, 3 W.L.R. at 704.
The issue also came up in the SEC's civil injunctive action against inside trader
Fred C. Lee when the Southern District Court of New York ordered Standard Chartered
Bank Plc, a British bank with branches in both New York and Hong Kong, to transfer
over $12 million in frozen assets held by Lee in a Hong Kong branch into the court's
registry. United States v. Wang, 699 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also infra notes 21-
26 and accompanying text.
See generally United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 384 (1965)
(freeze of Uruguayan corporation's assets, including account with Montevideo branch of
United States bank).
Finally, there is the possibility of a foreign court agreeing to impose an asset freeze
on accounts within its jurisdiction where there is a mutual legal assistance treaty in
place. In response to an SEC request for information related to SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d
1086 (2d Cir. 1987), under a U.S.-Swiss mutual legal assistance treaty, the Swiss Federal
Court held that under the treaty a Swiss court could impose an asset freeze on Swiss
accounts to prevent the dissipation of the proceeds of allegedly illegal trades in response
to such a request by the SEC. Recounted in Mann & Mari, Developments in Interna-
tional Securities Law Enforcement, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS 1990, 821,
889 (PLI, Corp. L. & Prac. Handbook Series No. 683, 1990) [hereinafter Mann & Mari].
For further information on mutual legal assistance treaties, see also infra notes 67-
72 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Securities and Ex-
change Commission's Application for ... an Order Freezing Assets, SEC v. Finacor An-
stalt, No. 89 Civ. 7667 (JMC) (S.D.N.Y. 1989) at 22-25.
14. The Second Circuit first held that the SEC could obtain noninjunctive relief
similar to disgorgement in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (so long as the relief was remedial and did not amount
to a "penalty assessment"). That holding was subsequently relied on in allowing a freeze
order to be imposed in SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir.
1972).
A permanent injunction against violations of the securities laws allows the SEC to go
directly into court and seek criminal contempt sanctions in the event the enjoinee subse-
quently commits a securities law violation.
15. Court Deals a Blow to SEC Global Insider Enforcement, 22 WALL STREET LET-
TER (Institutional Investor) No. 34, at 5 (Aug. 27, 1990) [hereinafter Court Deals a Blow]
(quoting Dan Goelzer, former SEC General Counsel). See also infra note 18.
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with a freeze in place of amounts of up to three times profits
earned,l" the incentive for the defendants to come forward and
litigate is much stronger.' 7
In the wake of Unifund, however, this strategy may no
longer be viable, since many defendants will be able to outlast a
brief freeze.' Because of the enormous practical difficulties of
conducting discovery abroad and the SEC's limited resources,
the SEC will rarely be able to go to trial quickly in insider trad-
ing cases where it has hastily put together an action based al-
most entirely on evidence of suspicious trading. 9 The Unifund
decision is likely, therefore, to serve as a brake to the questiona-
ble use by the SEC - with the complicity of United States
courts - of asset freeze orders as a means of avoiding the uncer-
tainties, delay, and expense involved in conducting discovery or
enforcing judgments abroad.
This Comment focuses primarily on two issues: (1) the ef-
fect of the Second Circuit's ruling in Unifund modifying the as-
16. The SEC is now entitled to seek a penalty equal to three times profits. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-1 (1988). Consequently, in Unifund the Second Circuit expressly approved the
practice of allowing an asset freeze to cover an amount equal to three times profits. SEC
v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028, 1042 (2d Cir. 1990).
17. See Remedies Bill, supra note 8, at A-5.
18. In a March 15, 1990, article for the Practicing Law Institute, Lee S. Richards,
I, noted that:
In the past, the simple tactic of defaulting was often quite sensible because the
SEC was less aggressive in asserting personal jurisdiction over foreigners, and
it had not yet fully exploited its power to freeze assets located within the
United States borders. However, today, the mere fact that a trade is executed
across an exchange in this country normally provides the SEC with sufficient
jurisdictional power to proceed and to freeze assets. . . Therefore, it now has a
means to make defaults more painful to foreigners and thereby to induce them
to appear and defend.
Richards, Legal Representation in the International Securities Markets: Representing
Clients in Securities and Exchange Commission, Department of Justice or Self-Regula-
tory Organization Proceedings Involving Foreign Citizens or Foreign Trading, in INTR-
NATIONAL SECURTIES MARKETS 1990, 143, at 157-58 (PLI, Corp. L. & Prac. Handbook
Series No. 683, 1990) [hereinafter Richards].
19. In Unifund, the SEC filed a complaint and obtained a temporary restraining
order against Unifund SAL, a Lebanese investment company, and other purchasers of
the common stock and stock options of Rorer Group, Inc. (Rorer) only two days after
Rorer announced that it had engaged in discussions with an undisclosed party concern-
ing the acquisition of 68% of Rorer's outstanding shares of common stock. SEC v. Foun-
dation Hal, SEC LITIGATION REa.LESE No. 12353 (Jan. 18, 1990), 1990 SEC LEXIS 144.
The SEC still had not even identified the alleged tipper when they filed a petition for
rehearing as to the freeze expiration order in August 1990. Petition of the Securities and
Exchange Commission for Rehearing as to the Duration of the Freeze Orders, SEC v.
Unifund SAL, Nos. 90-6057, 90-6091, 90-6093, 90-6103 (Aug. 1990) [hereinafter SEC Pe-
tition for Rehearing].
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set freeze order on the SEC's ability to prosecute foreign viola-
tors of the United States insider trading laws; and (2) the
propriety of that ruling in view of the SEC's showing in
Unifund, and, in larger terms, whether that ruling was appropri-
ate in view of the high utility of freeze orders to the SEC's suc-
cessful prosecution of offshore fraud.
II. THE ROLE OF THE ASSET FREEZE IN OTHER RECENT SEC Ac-
TIONS AGAINST FOREIGN INVESTORS
A. Asset Freeze Leading to Disgorgement
In several actions brought in the Second Circuit in recent
years, the SEC has ultimately succeeded in obtaining disgorge-
ment from foreign traders accused of violating United States in-
sider trading laws despite having initiated many of the actions
solely on the basis of evidence of "anomalous trading in advance
of a major corporate announcement." 2 The court's willingness
to impose an asset freeze on the foreign traders' accounts has
played a critical role in those successes.
In SEC v. Wang,21 for example, defendant Fred C. Lee, a
Hong Kong investor, failed to answer the SEC's complaint and
"flatly ignored" a preliminary injunction entered by the South-
ern District Court of New York (following an earlier asset freeze
order issued as part of a temporary restraining order)22 which
enjoined him from transferring or suing for his assets.2 Lee's
assets included over 12.5 million dollars in a bank account in
Hong Kong. When Lee sued in Hong Kong to recover his bank
account, the district court took the controversial step of ordering
the Hong Kong bank to deposit those funds in the court's regis-
try.24 The court, in denying Lee's belated attempt to set aside
the default judgment, pointed out that Lee had "willfully disre-
garded the authority" of the court and had employed a litigation
strategy which was "willfully contemptuous of [the] proceed-
ings," by making a general appearance only after the 12.5 mil-
lion dollars was deposited into the court's registry.25 Hence, were
20. Id. at 4.
21. 699 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
22. The freeze order was first granted as part of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) -issued on the same day the SEC originally filed the action. Mann & Mari, supra
note 12, at 873.
23. Wang, 699 F. Supp. at 45.
24. Id. See supra note 12.
25. Wang, 699 F. Supp. at 45-46.
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it not for the imposition of the asset freeze, it appears that the
SEC would have had very little chance of recovering any of the
proceeds from Lee's illegal trades.2"
An asset freeze was probably the key to achieving disgorge-
ment in SEC v. Tome27 as well. In Tome, after noticing "undue
activity in the options market" immediately preceding the pub-.
lic announcement of a tender offer for the stock of St. Joe Min-
erals Corporation, the SEC quickly instituted a civil enforce-
ment action against Banca Della Svizzera Italiana (BSI), a Swiss
bank, and certain unknown purchasers. 28 The SEC obtained an
order freezing the proceeds from the trades, which were held in
BSI's bank account with the Irving Trust Company in New
York.29 The SEC did not name Guisseppe Tome in the original
complaint, but they wanted to speak with him since he was the
registered representative on some of ihe trades.3 0 Although he
knew of the SEC's interest in speaking with him, Tome "left the
country before they were able to track him down."'
Since Tome never returned to the United States,32 the
freeze on the proceeds ended up being critical to the SEC's suc-
cessful recovery of the proceeds of Tome's illegal trades through
a court order of disgorgement. Tome also illustrates how dis-
gorgement has become an effective tool of enforcement for the
SEC, acting as a deterrent to foreign investors contemplating vi-
olations of the United States insider trading laws. 33
26. Lee had allegedly obtained inside information about 21 "issuers" from defend-
ant Stephen Wang, Jr., an employee of a New York investment banking firm. SEC v.
Wang, 1989 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) Para. 94, 727, n.2 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1989). The
SEC ultimately received a disgorgement order of about $19 million as part of a final
judgment whereby Lee agreed to disgorge assets of over $25 million. SEC v. Wang, No.
88 Civ. 4461 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist File).
27. 833 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub. nom, Lombardfin S.p.A. v. SEC,
486 U.S. 1014 (1988).
28. SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
29. Id. at 113.
30. SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596, 600 n.4. (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 601.
33. "Whether or not any investors are entitled to money damages is immaterial. The
paramount purpose of enforcing the prohibition against insider trading by ordering dis-
gorgement is to make sure that wrongdoers will not profit from their wrongdoing." SEC
v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086, 1096 (2d Cir. 1987).
"The [treble] penalty's deterrent purpose, to make an insider trader not just surren-
der his ill-gotten gains, but face severe penalties as well, is important to effective securi-
ties law enforcement." SEC v. Wang, 699 F. Supp. 44, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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B. The Asset Freeze as a Litigation "Weapon"
While freeze orders have been instrumental in successfully
achieving the recovery of the proceeds of fraudulent trades by
foreigners on United States markets, the SEC has at times ap-
peared to use the freeze as more of a weapon than as a protec-
tive shield of their possible right to recovery.
An asset freeze order has the immediate effect of preserving
a fund for any potential recovery, yet quite often it also has the
effect of compelling a defendant to appear in court rather than
to continue to remain anonymous or outside of the court's juris-
diction. 4 Thus, in some cases, the rather innocuously termed
ancillary35 remedy of a freeze order can be used as a very effec-
tive strong arm tactic. While such a use of a freeze order may
not seem unfair given the defense tactic it is acting to prevent -
staying outside the court's jurisdiction and defaulting - it be-
comes more questionable where it is held in place for an ex-
tended time while the SEC slowly engages in what defense law-
yers claim amounts to a "fishing expedition." 6
Examples of both the "legitimate" and "illegitimate" use of
a freeze order can be found in SEC v. Finacor Anstalt,3 7 an ac-
tion brought by the SEC in November 1989. The SEC brought
suit in Finacor following suspicious trading in the stock and call
options of Combustion Engineering, Inc. (CE), a United States
corporation, just prior to the public announcement of a proposed
tender offer for eighty percent of CE's outstanding common
stock by ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd. (ABB), a Swiss corpora-
tion.' The SEC named Finacor Anstalt, a Liechtenstein-based
entity, and "Certain Purchasers of Call Option Contracts for the
Common Stock of Combustion Engineering" as defendants.3
34. "[F]reeze Orders often compel a client to appear and defend when otherwise he
might be inclined to default." Richards, supra note 18, at 188.
35. By definition, therefore, a freeze order is merely "incidental" relief. Indeed, in
his opinion for the unanimous panel in Unifund, Judge Newman characterized the freeze
order as ancillary relief which "[sfimply assures that any funds that may become due
can be collected." SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028, 1041 (2d Cir. 1990) (emphasis
added).
36. See, e.g., Bigger Ante Needed to Settle Civil Cases, SEC Official Says, 22 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 41 (Oct. 19, 1990) [hereinafter Bigger Ante] (quoting an attorney
who "suggested that the SEC brings a case first, then later determines whether in fact it
was necessary to do so").
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The latter were two entities that had purchased CE call options:
one through an account with a Toronto brokerage firm main-
tained by a Cayman bank, the other through an account with a
United States brokerage firm maintained by a Luxembourg
bank.40 So, as in Unifund, the SEC did not name specific indi-
viduals in the original complaint.
Following a pattern repeated in many other recent civil en-
forcement actions, the SEC acted swiftly - filing a complaint
and obtaining a temporary restraining order (TRO) and asset
freeze within one week after the public announcement of the
merger.4' The asset freeze was imposed upon the defendants'
trading accounts with United States brokerage firms, preventing
the "disposition, transfer or dissipation" of any CE securities or
proceeds from the sale of CE securities. 42 Unlike Unifund how-
ever, the SEC was able to learn the identity of a possible tipper
quite quickly. Christian Norgren, a member of the board of ABB
and Chairman of the Bank in Liechtenstein AG, admitted after
being fired by the Bank in Liechtenstein and forced off the ABB
board that he was. a part owner of Finacor.4 s The SEC also was
helped in this action by "unusual cooperation from the banks
involved in Liechtenstein and the Cayman Islands," and by
ABB officials.
44
Nevertheless, despite the breaks it received in prosecuting
the Finacor case, the SEC did not even amend the complaint to
name Norgren until ten months after learning that he was a
principal owner of Finacor.4 Although Finacor had eventually
consented to a preliminary injunction and an asset freeze,46 un-
like the defendant in Unifund, the length of time it took the
SEC to amend the complaint (after nearly one year it was still
not ready to go to trial) is illustrative of how long the courts
have let such freeze orders stay in place and how long it has
40. Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, SEC v. Finacor
Anstalt, 89 Civ. No. 7667 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 16, 1989).
41. Finacor Anstalt, SEC LITIGATION RELEASE No. 12296, 1989 LEXIS 2242 (Nov.
20, 1989).
42. Temporary Restraining Order, SEC v. Finacor Anstalt, 89 Civ. No. 7667
(S.D.N.Y. fied Nov. 16, 1989), at 3.
43. Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 1989, at A3. Norgren was fired by the bank and forced off
ABB's board because of suspicions that Norgren had engaged in insider trading. Id.
44. Tumulty, Businessman Faces-Civil Charges in Stock Probe, Gannet News Ser-
vice, Sept. 6, 1990 [hereinafter Tumulty].
45. SEC Amends Insider Trading Suit, Names Owner of Liechtenstein Firm, DAiLY
REP. FOR ExacUrvIs DER No. 175, at A-8 (Sept. 10, 1990).
46. Order on Consent, Finacor (89 Civ. No. 7667) (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 22, 1989).
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taken the SEC to prepare for trial in such cases. Indeed, counsel
for Finacor Anstalt claimed that if the SEC had not "adopted a
rigid agenda unrelated to the merits of this action," the case
would have been settled.47
Up until the Unifund decision, rather than balk at the use
of the asset freeze as a litigation tactic, the courts have appeared
to affirm and condone such tactics. For example, in SEC v. Cer-
tain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock of, and Call
Options for the Common Stock of, Santa Fe Int'l Corp.,4 8 in
rejecting a request by an options market maker to modify a
freeze of over 5.5 million dollars of the unknown purchasers'
funds to allow execution of a default judgment, the district court
stated that the court's "control over the funds acts as an incen-
tive for the unknown purchasers to come forward and litigate
the allegations. '49 Thus, where the identities of the defendants
are initially unknown and the bank or brokerage firm containing
the defendants' accounts refuses to divulge their identities on
the ground that to do so would violate another country's bank
secrecy laws, rather than relying on the cumbersome and uncer-
tain procedures under the Hague Convention on Taking of Evi-
dence (Hague Evidence Convention)"0 or some sort of mutual as-
sistance treaty,51 the SEC can attempt to lure foreign
defendants into court by freezing their United States assets.2
C. Conducting Discovery and Enforcing Judgments Abroad
Spurring defendants to come into court and litigate is vi-
tally important because of two procedural realities: discovery
abroad with a recalcitrant foreign party is arduous and problem-
atic, and should the defendant refuse to litigate at all, getting a
default judgment enforced overseas is difficult and often beyond
47. Tumulty, supra note 44. For its part, the SEC alleged earlier in the case that
Finacor refused to permit any discovery concerning "its role in the transaction or its
relationship to Norgren." Supplemental memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Securities
and Exchange Commission's Application for... an Order Freezing Assets ... SEC v.
Finacor Anstalt, No. 89 Civ. 7667 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) at 21.
48. FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) Para. 99, 424 [1983-84 Transfer Binder] (Aug. 10,
1983).
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. Hague Convention on Taking Evidence, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23
U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444 (entered into force Oct. 7, 1972) [hereinafter Evidence
Convention].
51. See infra notes 53-76 and accompanying text (Section II.C).
52. See supra note 18.
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the SEC's resources.
Where a foreign defendant refuses to voluntarily provide
the SEC with information, and unlike Finacor,5 3 the SEC ini-
tially receives little or no cooperation from the foreign banks in-
volved, the SEC will attempt to gather information under the
Hague Evidence Convention, a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU), or a mutual legal assistance treaty.
The SEC, like any civil litigant, can attempt to obtain infor-
mation abroad under the Hague Evidence Convention. That
convention presents the SEC with several options: (1) requesting
the district court to send a "Letter of Request" 4 to the govern-
ment of a country, which forwards it to a court in that country
where the evidentiary proceedings will take place;55 (2) request-
ing that a United States diplomatic or consular officer in a cer-
tain country take evidence there;5 or (3) requesting that a spe-
cifically appointed commissioner take evidence in that country.57
However, those procedures are slow" and are limited by the
requirement that any requested evidentiary proceedings must be
compatible with the law of the country receiving the request.59
For example, many countries refuse to issue letters of request to
compel pretrial document production. 0 In addition, in order to
obtain testimony of witnesses before trial under the Hague Evi-
dence Convention, the SEC must show that the testimony is
53. See infra notes 34-52 and accompanying text (Section lI.B).
54. Commonly referred to as "letters rogatory."
55. Evidence Convention, supra note 50, at arts. 1-2.
56. Evidence Convention, supra note 50, at arts. 15-16.
57. Evidence Convention, supra note 50, at art. 17.
58. Goelzer & Sullivan, Obtaining Evidence for the International Enforcement of
the United States Securities Laws, 16 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 145, 169 (1990) [hereinafter
Goelzer & Sullivan] (recounting SEC's attempt to use the Hague Evidence Convention in
SEC v. Santa Fe, 81 Civ. No. 6553 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), where letters of request sent by the
court to France were rejected after over a two-year wait).
In Unifund, the SEC complained of extensive delays in attempting to obtain infor-
mation in France under the Hague Evidence Convention - being stymied after attempts
to obtain-telephone records, and having to serve a "supplemental Hague Convention re-
quest" after the cousin of Unifund's president refused to testify except in his capacity as
chairman of Bank Audi France. SEC Petition for Rehearing, supra note 19, at 7-8. The
SEC submitted affidavits of government lawyers to confirm its assertion that "responses
to ... [Hague Evidence Convention] requests are generally subject to delay." SEC Peti-
tion for Rehearing, supra note 19, at 7.
See Risenberg & Franco, Discovery in Foreign Lands, THE RECORDER June 6, 1991,
at 4.
59. Evidence Convention, supra note 50, at art. 9.
60. Richards, supra note 18, at 157.
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"relevant."' This requirement restricts the fact-finding element
of the more liberal United States discovery procedures.2
Obtaining evidence under an MOU can also be problematic.
MOUs are nonbinding agreements, usually between the SEC and
its counterpart within a certain country, which provide for mu-
tual assistance in investigations of securities law violations.6 "
MOUs vary in scope from those that generally facilitate requests
for information in insider trading investigations to those that
provide that each securities regulation agency will provide "the
fullest mutual assistance," including use of any and all compul-
sory powers to conduct an investigation on behalf of the request-
ing state.6 4 The most recent MOUs concluded between the SEC
and its counterparts have been of the latter, more effective vari-
ety. 5 In addition, all of the MOUs provide for assistance even
where the authority requesting information is investigating con-
duct which is not an offense in the country receiving the
request.
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Mutual legal assistance treaties are binding, bilateral agree-
ments entered into between the United States and other coun-
tries, which provide for mutual assistance in criminal matters,
including securities law offenses.6 7 Because violation of the
United States securities laws can result in criminal penalties, the
SEC can rely on these agreements despite lacking the power to
initiate criminal actions itself.
6 8
The SEC now has MOUs and mutual legal assistance trea-
ties with quite a few countries,69 and has had some success re-
61. Richards, supra note 18, at 157-58.
62. See Richards, supra note 18, at 158.
63. See Mann & Mari, supra note 12, at 892.
64. Goelzer & Sullivan, supra note 58, at 172-74.
65. Goelzer & Sullivan, supra note 58, at 173-74.
66. Mann & Mari, supra note 12, at 892.
67. See Goelzer & Sullivan, supra note 58, at 154.
68. Mann & Mari, supra note 12, at 877.
69. The SEC has MOUs or like agreements with Brazil, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry, the Commission des Operations de Bourse
(France), the Ministry of Finance of Japan, and the securities commissions of the Cana-
dian provinces of Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia. Mann & Mari, supra note 12,
at 892. The SEC and the Commissione Nazionale per le Societe e la Borsa (Italy) have
signed a "Communique on Exchange of Information." Mann & Mari, supra note 12, at
904.
The United States has entered into various bilateral and multilateral treaties for the
production of evidence with the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Turkey, Italy, Ca-
nada, and the Cayman Islands. Mann & Mar, supra note 12, at 877-91.
For a discussion of the SEC's efforts in Unifund to obtain information under a mu-
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cently obtaining 'evidence under those agreements. ° On the
other hand, gathering information under either of those methods
can be slow, success is uncertain,71 and the SEC is further ham-
pered by limited funds to spend on obtaining evidence and de-
posing witnesses abroad. 2
The reality of limited resources is also a reason why the
SEC has had little success enforcing judgments abroad. The
principle justification for imposing a freeze on the assets of a
defendant in an SEC civil enforcement action is that a freeze
acts to preserve the status quo by preventing the defendant
from moving the funds offshore. 73 This justification rests on the
recognition by the court that should the funds be moved off-
shore, the SEC may have great difficulty in attaching those
funds overseas to satisfy any judgment it may receive.7 4 In a No-
vember 1989 interview with the Bureau of National Affairs,
Michael Mann, Associate Enforcement Director in the SEC's Of-
fice of International Affairs, said that the "globalization of the
markets will rdsult in a greater number of cases in which unlaw-
ful proceeds are deposited in foreign accounts, [and d]espite an
tual assistance treaty between the United States and Switzerland, see infra note 113 and
accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock of, and
Call Options for the Common Stock of Santa Fe International Corporation, 81 Civ. No.
6553 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (SEC obtains information from Swiss banks as to the identities of
certain account holders after two-year-long battle).
For a more comprehensive review of the SEC's successes and failures obtaining evi-
dence under international agreements see Mann & Mari, supra note 12, at 877-915.
71. See Goelzer & Sullivan, supra note 58, at 178.
72. "Applying for judicial assistance ... [to a foreign court] is not a substantially
equivalent means for obtaining production because of the cost in time and money and
the uncertain likelihood of success in obtaining the order." United States v. The Bank of
Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384, 1390 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983).
73. See United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 385 (1965) (quoting
language from Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 290 (1940) in ap,
proving the district court's order in a tax lien foreclosure action freezing the accounts of
a Uruguayan corporation which were located in the Montevideo branch of a United
States bank). See supra note 12.
74. One defense attorney listed the factors favoring advising a foreign client to de-
fault as: "the SEC's past reluctance to seek enforcement of judgments abroad, the unen-
forceability of ITSA penalties [treble damages] abroad in most cases and the difficulty of
locating the assets abroad." Richards, supra note 18, at 166. Given the SEC's willingness
to ask United States courts to use contempt powers to compel foreign banks to divulge
information in violation of foreign laws or court orders, see, e.g., SEC v. Wang, 699 F.
Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), discussed in note 12, it is probably fair to assume that the
SEC's "reludtance to seek enforcement of judgments abroad" stems from concerns over
the expense of such efforts (financially and temporally) rather than worries about inter-
national comity.
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increase in international agreements ... the SEC will have
greater difficulty in seeking jurisdiction over the illegal
profits.
'7 5
Thus, although it has had some success in recent years in
obtaining evidence abroad under various international agree-
ments, the SEC is faced with many practical difficulties in at-
tempting to conduct discovery and enforce judgments abroad.
Do these practical problems justify the imposition of an asset
freeze for an unlimited duration? The court in Unifund appar-
ently thought not.
76
III. SEC v. UNIFUND SAL
A. Facts Alleged
On January 17, 1990, the SEC filed a complaint in the
Southern District of New York against Fondation Hai, Holding
Protection Ltd., 7 Robert Rossi,7 Unifund SAL, 9 and "Certain
Purchasers of the Common Stock of and Options to Purchase
the Common Stock of the Rorer Group, Inc." 80 The complaint
alleged that between January 4 and January 11, 1990, the de-
fendants purchased a total of 168,500 shares of the common
stock of Rorer and 4,013 Rorer February call option contracts
while in possession of material, nonpublic information regarding
the negotiations between Rorer and Rhone-Poulenc, S.A.
(Rhone) concerning the acquisition by Rhone of sixty-eight per-
cent of Rorer's outstanding shares of common stock for seventy-
three dollars per share. Rorer publicly announced the existence
75. Global Recognition of Legal Judgments Next Big Enforcement Issue, Mann
Advises, DAyY REP. FOR ExEcuwvs (BNA) No. 220, C-1 (Nov. 16, 1989).
76. See infra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
77. Holding Protection, Ltd. (Holding) is a Cayman Islands corporation, solely
owned by Namek F. Idrissi, owner of an insurance agency with offices in Lebanon, Saudi
Arabia, England, and Greece. The SEC's request for a preliminary injunction and freeze
order against Holding was denied in April. SEC v. Foundation Hal, 1990 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) Para. 95, 248 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 1990).
78. Rossi, a Swiss investor, settled with the SEC in July. 22 SEC. REG. & L. REPT.
(BNA) No. 28, at 1036 (July 13, 1990). In the consent agreement with the SEC, Rossi
agreed to disgorge over $1.4 million and was barred from securities law violations. Id.
79. Unifund is a Lebanese investment company. SEC v. Foundation Hal, 736 F.
Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
80. Tamanaco was not named in the initial complaint. The SEC delivered the origi-
nal complaint and TRO to Esperito Santo (through which Tamanaco had made the
Rorer purchases) via the Swiss police. Id. at 469. The SEC later served papers on
Tamanaco's attorney after learning Tamanaco's identity on January 30, 1990. Id.
Tamanaco is a Panamanian corporation. Id. at 466.
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of the merger discussions on January 15, 1990.81
According to the SEC, Unifund SAL purchased its Rorer
shares and options through the Beirut office of a Merrill Lynch
subsidiary.8 2 After the public announcement, Unifund realized a
gain of over 1.5 million dollars when it sold its Rorer holdings.85
Tamanaco purchased Rorer call options through an account
maintained with the Lausanne branch of a Dean Witter Reyn-
olds Inc. by Compagnie Financiere Esperito Santo (Esperito
Santo), a Swiss bank. 4 Tamanaco's profit was approximately
660,000 dollars.85 Esperito Santo itself purchased 3,000 shares of
Rorer's common stock through the Swiss branch of a Florida-
based brokerage, Raymond James & Associates (Raymond
James).86
In support of its allegations that defendant Unifund and
Tamanaco were "tippees" who knowingly traded on misappro-
priated, material, nonpublic information, the SEC relied primar-
ily on the unusual trading activity of the defendant, 87 but also
on a possible connection between the defendants (Unifund and
Tamanaco) and an unnamed tipper.8 In a telephone interview
with the SEC, Candid Peyer, Esperito Santo's broker at Ray-
mond James, allegedly told the SEC that a friend s had told him
in mid-December 1989 that "if you want a Christmas gift, buy
February 60 calls in Rorer."90 Peyer admitted to the SEC that
81. Id.
82. Id. at 467.
83. SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028, 1030 (2d Cir. 1990).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Foundation Hai, 736 F. Supp. at 467.
87. Summed up by the district court as "[tihe sudden and timely interest these de-
fendants had in Rorer securities . . . ." Id. at 473.
88. Id. at 471-72. See also infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
89. Peyer said that his friend obtained the information from a stockbroker at a bro-
kerage firm in Lausanne. Unifund, 910 F.2d at 1031. At some time subsequent to the
date the parties appeared before the Second Circuit, the SEC apparently learned of the
identity of Peyer's "friend," a Bruno Emmenegger. SEC Petition for Rehearing, supra
note 19, at 6. The court in Unifund labeled Peyer's friend an "independent money man-
ager in Geneva .. ." 910 F.2d at 1031. The SEC asserted that Emmenegger was "a
broker for the bank where Tamanaco maintained its trading account . . . " SEC Peti-
tion for Rehearing, supra note 19, at 6, while Tamanaco rejected the SEC's assertion,
stating that Emmenegger is "not a broker for that bank ... or a broker at all .... "
Defendant-Appellant Tamanaco Saudi & Gulf Investment Group's Response to Petition
for Rehearing (Nos. 90-6057, 90-6091, 90-6093, 90-6103) at 4 [hereinafter Tamanaco's
Response].
90. Unifund, 910 F.2d at 1031. Tamanaco asserted in its response to the SEC's Peti-
tion for Rehearing that under oath Peyer denied that this statement was made to him.
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he thought his friend had inside information concerning a take-
over of Rorer, and later told the SEC that the information
"came from . . . the direction . . ." of one of the entities con-
nected with the Unifund action.9 1 To connect this tip to
Unifund, the SEC pointed to the fact that Ralph Audi, the prin-
cipal shareholder of Unifund, was related to individuals who run
Bank Audi and its Swiss affiliate, Bank Audi Suisse.2 Bank
Audi Suisse purchased call options through Raymond James in
the week prior to the public merger announcement.9 " In its deci-
sion granting the preliminary injunction, the district court also
noted that there was a "potential connection" between Unifund
and Rhone in that the last name of the Rhone executive respon-
sible for promotion in the Near and Middle East, Amer Khoury,
is the same as that of Ralph Audi's attorney and Unifund
founder, Farid El Khoury. 4
B. Procedural History
On January 17, 1990, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York issued a TRO which re-
strained and enjoined the defendants from violating section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193411 and Rule 10b-596
thereunder.9 7 The TRO also froze defendants' brokerage ac-
counts pending a hearing on the SEC's motion for a preliminary
injunction. 8 The SEC served Unifund SAL by sending the com-
plaint and the TRO to its New York broker for forwarding;9 the
SEC served Tamanaco by delivering the complaint and TRO to
the Swiss police, who delivered them to Esperito Santo.100 On
February 14 and March 1, 1990, the district court granted pre-
liminary injunctions against Tamanaco and Unifund SAL, re-
spectively.101 Tamanaco and Unifund SAL appealed from that
Tamanaco's Response, supra note 89, at 4.




95. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988).
96. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (Apr. 1, 1990).
97. Foundation Hai, SEC LrIGATION RELEASE No. 12353, 1990 LEXIS 144 (Jan. 18,
1990).
98. Id.
99. SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028, 1033-34 (2d Cir. 1990).
100. SEC v. Foundation Hal, 736 F. Supp. 465, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
101. Id. In addition to a preliminary injunction against future violations of section
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order.
C. The Decision on Appeal
The Second Circuit vacated the part of the injunction which
barred future violations, modified the freeze order by removing
the requirement that all trading in the accounts be approved by
the SEC,10 2 and ruled that the freeze order would terminate
thirty days from the issuance of its mandate if the SEC had not
advised the district court by then that it was ready to go to
trial.10 3 The court, taking into account the time that had elapsed
since the injunction was issued, stated that "[i]n view of the
Commission's meager showing on the merits, it should not be
entitled to interfere with the appellants' unrestricted use of
their accounts for more than a brief interval.'
'10 4
The court found that the SEC's showing contained a "fun-
damental gap" because while there was evidence of unusual
trading which implied that defendants possessed inside informa-
tion, the SEC had not identified the source of that informa-
tion. 0 5 Citing Dirks v. SEC, 0 the court pointed out that "pos-
session . . . of [inside] information without more does not give
rise to a duty to disclose or abstain from trading. . . where the
recipient of the information is an ordinary investor.' 0 7 The
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lob-5 thereunder, the court issued
an order preventing the destruction or alteration of documents and an order freezing the
defendants' brokerage accounts. Id. at 474. The freeze order provided that the brokerage
accounts maintain amounts sufficient to pay a potential civil penalty of three times profit
in addition to potential disgorgement of the profits, and that any trading in the accounts
would be subject to SEC approval. Unifund, 910 F.2d at 1041-42. Unifund's account
contained $3.7 million; Tamanaco's account contained $680,000. SEC v. Foundation Hai,
SEC LITIGATION RELEASE No. 12399 (Mar. 5, 1990), 1990 SEC LEXIS 378.
102. So long as the amounts contained in the defendants' accounts did not fall be-
low two times the profits they earned on the Rorer trades. Unifund, 910 F.2d at 1042.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1042-43.
105. Id. at 1040-41.
106. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
107. Unifund, 910 F.2d at 1041.
More specifically, the court explained that since under Dirks a "'tippee's duty to
disclose or abstain [from trading] is derivative from that of the insider's duty,' . . ."
without the SEC having identified the defendants' tipper "we do not know from whom
such a duty might derive in this case." Id. at 1040 (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659).
Thus, without knowing the identity of the tipper, it is difficult for the court to deter-
mine whether or not the defendants knew or should have known that they were breach-
ing a fiduciary duty by trading on material nonpublic information - a required element
of an insider trading violation. Unifund, 910 F.2d at 1040. The court declined to decide
at that time though, "whether the requisite breach of fiduciary duty ... can be estab-
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court did however approve the initial grant of the SEC's freeze
request, stating that:
Though the Commission has not presented at this stage suffi-
cient evidence to warrant a preliminary injunction of tradi-
tional scope, its evidence suffices to warrant some form of
freeze order. There is a basis to infer that the appellants
traded on inside information, and ... the Commission should
be able to preserve its opportunity to collect funds that may
yet be ordered disgorged. 08
Furthermore, the court found that, in view of the enactment of
legislation by Congress amending the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to allow the SEC to seek a penalty equal to three times
profit gained through insider trading,10 the imposition of a
freeze order covering such an amount was appropriate.
Finally, although it is not within the main focus of this
Comment, it should be noted that the court's opinion in
Unifund, after extensive review of the often ambiguous and con-
flicting precedents in the Second Circuit, clearly laid out the
standards that the SEC would have to meet in order to obtain
preliminary injunctive relief in that circuit.110 The court's hold-
lished without identification of either the tippee's immediate tipper or the insider who
first disclosed the nonpublic information to those relaying it to the tippee." Id. at 1040
n.12.
The latter comment by the court was apparently a reference to the controversial
ruling by the Second Circuit in United States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990). In
that decision, the court reversed the insider trading conviction of a broker who traded on
confidential information of an impending takeover of Waldbaum Inc. obtained through a
chain of Waldbaum family members. Id. The court held in part that in order to convict
Chestman under Rule 10b-5 as an aider/abettor (in the misappropriation of material,
nonpublic information) or as a tippee, the government had to specifically prove that
Chestman knew that the immediate tipper was breaching "a duty of trust and confi-
dence." Id. at 79.
In August 1990 the Second Circuit took the unusual step.of agreeing to hold an en
banc review of the panel's decision in Chestman, FED. SEC. L. REP. Para. 95,439 [1989-90
Transfer Binder] (Aug. 24, 1990). The result of that review is important in weighing the
court's holding in Unifund, because the SEC's strong circumstantial evidence of highly
suspect trading by the defendants is not as "meager" if they do not have to prove that
the defendants specifically knew that their tipper (when identified) was breaching a con-
fidential duty.
108. Unifund, 910 F.2d at 1041.
109. See supra note 16.
110. Unifund, 910 F.2d at 1035-40. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Elman, 761 F.
Supp. 245, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (following Unifund in rejecting the application of the
"serious questions on the merits" test to a preliminary injunction sought by "any govern-
ment agency").
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ing in that regard was largely favorable to the SEC.111
Following the August 3, 1990 decision, the SEC submitted a
petition for rehearing as to the thirty-day freeze expiration or-
der. 1 2 The SEC argued that the freeze order should stay in
place for a longer period of time "in view of the difficulties and
delays inherent in foreign evidence-gathering and the defend-
ants' stonewalling tactics." 1 3  Unifund and Tamanaco vehe-
mently denied the SEC's accusations of stonewalling in their re-
sponses to the SEC's petition for rehearing."
4
The Second Circuit denied the petition for rehearing on Oc-
tober 23, 1990.11 The court did not directly address the sub-
stance of the SEC's complaints about the slow pace of discovery
abroad and the defendants' alleged stonewalling. Rather, the
court pointed out that the SEC's arguments were based on the
faulty premise that the court "intended to permit the freeze or-
der to remain in effect until completion of discovery and that
. . . [the court] must have considered the seven months that
had elapsed since the filing of the complaint . . . as sufficient
time for this purpose."""' The court rejected that reading of the
freeze expiration order, explaining that it was the SEC's "mea-
ger showing" which served as the impetus for the court's conclu-
111. Noting that the district court, following the lead of many other cases in the
district courts of that circuit, had required that the SEC meet a "strong prima facie
case" standard on the merits in seeking a preliminary injunction, the Second Circuit
traced the requirement back to its genesis in a 1960 decision, SEC v. Boren, 283 F.2d
312, 313 (2d Cir. 1960). Unifund, 910 F.2d at 1036. The court concluded that there was
no basis for requiring that the SEC meet any greater a burden on the merits than the
"likelihood of success" standard traditionally applied to private litigants. Id. at 1037.
The court did however go on to say that for all litigants a "more substantial show-
ing" of likelihood of success should be required "whenever the relief sought is more than
preservation of the status quo." Id. at 1039. It was because the SEC's showing did not
satisfy this added burden that the court vacated the preliminary injunction against fu-
ture violations of the securities laws. Id. at 1040-41. See infra note 121.
112. SEC Petition for Rehearing, supra note 19.
113. SEC Petition for Rehearing, supra note 19, at 2. In particular the SEC pointed
to its requests for assistance from the Swiss authorities (made pursuant to the U.S.-
Swiss mutual assistance treaty), which had not yet been fulfilled, and its attempts to
obtain testimony from witnesses located in France under the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion, which at that time had proved largely fruitless. SEC Petition for Rehearing, supra
note 19, at 5-8. See supra notes 50-76 and accompanying text.
114. Tamanaco's Response, supra note 89, at 4; Unifund's Response, supra note 5,
at 10-12.
115. On Petition for Rehearing, SEC v. Unifund SAL, Nos. 90-6093, 90-6057, 90-
6091, 90-6103 (2d Cir. Oct. 23, 1990) (LEXIS Genfed Library, Ctapp File) [hereinafter
Rehearing Decision].
116. Id. at 2.
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sion that the SEC would have to choose whether to go "to trial.
very rapidly with the benefit of the freeze order or... [prepare]
for trial beyond . . . [the] thirty-day limit without the freeze
order."117
The court also made it clear though that it "did not intend
to establish any particular time period as the duration for freeze
orders in subsequent insider trading cases.""" In general, the
court explained, the duration of freeze orders would be largely
up to the district court's discretion. 119 In Unifund, however, be-
cause of the "circuihstances" of that case an eight-month long
freeze order was at the "outer limit of allowable discretion.'
1 20
D. Analysis
The actual extent to which the Unifund decision will impair
the SEC's ability to prosecute offshore fraud cannot be precisely
gauged at the moment. Much will depend on how the district
courts of the Second Circuit interpret the key language in the
Unifund opinion. 121 What, for instance, will the district courts
determine to be a "brief interval" in future cases - six months?
At what point in time will they decide that keeping a freeze or-
der in place is approaching the "outer limits of allowable discre-
tion?" Although in denying the SEC's petition for rehearing the
Second Circuit took pains to point out that the Unifund deci-
sion was very fact specific,122 the district courts may well see the
decision as a warning to them not to stray too far in the use of
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2-3.
120. Id. at 3.
121. In the short time since Unifund was decided and this Comment was written,
two district courts have referred to that decision. Neither reference was related to the
issue of the asset freeze duration.
In SEC v. Heider, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) Para. 95, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), the court
rejected the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on grounds that Unifund re-
quired that the SEC name a tipper in the complaint. The court disagreed with that
reading of Unifund, citing SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1987), as evidence that
the Second Circuit "recognized the process of discovery and amending the complaint the
S.E.C. may go through, particularly where the defendants are foreign nationals." See
supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text.
In Resolution Trust Corp. v. Elman, 761 F. Supp. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) the district
court cited Unifund for authority for the proposition that the more burdensome the
preliminary injunctive relief, the more persuasive a showing the party seeking such relief
must make. 761 F. Supp. at 249.
122. Rehearing Decision, supra note 115, at 2-3. See supra note 114 and accompa-
nying text.
1991]
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
their equitable powers to assist government plaintiffs. This
Comment takes the view that such an interpretation of Unifund
is both correct and desirable. That is, by weighing the possible
effect of a freeze order of long duration on the defendants
against the SEC's showing on the merits against those defend-
ants, the court's decision can and should serve to rein in judicial
assistance in what often would more properly be called SEC
"enforcement investigations," rather than "enforcement
actions." 123
As discussed above, the SEC typically bfings actions against
suspected violators of the insider trading laws within a few days
following a major public announcement about a particular cor-
poration, which makes an earlier surge in trading in that corpo-
ration's securities highly suspicious. William McLucas, SEC En-
forcement Director, remarked in reference to cases such as
Unifund that "[w]e have 24 hours, and then the money's gone,"
adding that, "[o]nce the money is gone, the case is basically
gone."124 In most cases, therefore, the SEC is not going to be
able to begin such actions with a great deal of evidence amassed,
and even with an expedited discovery order in hand the SEC
may be hard pressed to gather enough information to go to trial
in six or seven months. A former Enforcement Director, Gary
Lynch has stated that, because of the court's decision in
Unifund, he did "not think unknown purchaser cases will go for-
ward because he doubts the commission can meet the burden
imposed on it by the Second Circuit.11 2 5 Consequently, the effect
of the Unifund decision on the SEC's ability to pursue foreign
investors may be profound.
Despite its likely harmful effect on the SEC's enforcement
ability, the Second Circuit's decision was necessary to avoid po-
tential unfairness in the use of the asset freeze. Judge Newman,
writing for the unanimous court in Unifund, relied on general
principles of equity in assessing how substantial a showing on
the merits must be in order to justify an award of a particular
123. One defense lawyer commented that "few, if any, of the SEC's efforts in the
last few years to obtain evidence abroad or sue those who trade abroad seem to have met
with any meaningful resistance from United States courts." Richards, supra note 18, at
145.
124. See Remedies Bill, supra note 8, at A-5. A former General Counsel of the SEC
similarly remarked in reaction to Unifund that "[i]f the freeze is lifted, the foreign enti-
ties have no reason to cooperate with the investigation." Court Deals a Blow, supra note
15.
125. See generally Bigger Ante, supra note 36.
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form of interim relief. For each component of the preliminary
injunction, the court weighed the showing made by the SEC
against the effect of that component upon the defendants. In
modifying the freeze order by removing the requirement that
the defendants seek SEC approval for any trades in their ac-
counts, the court referred to the "basic principle that burden-
some forms of interim relief require correspondingly substantial
justification .... ,,12' Thus, in reverse, the procedural unfair-
ness of allowing a freeze on the assets of a defendant to remain
in place for a long time without a showing of more than circum-
stantial evidence of securities violations outweighs the risk that
the SEC will lose the opportunity to obtain disgorgement in the
event violations are proven.
Moreover, the Unifund decision made it easier for the SEC
to obtain an asset freeze order in the first place. As noted above,
the Second Circuit held that the initial grant of the freeze order
was proper despite the SEC's "meager showing" since there was
"a basis to infer" that Unifund and Tamanaco had engaged in
insider trading.127 Although-that image of the asset freeze cannot
easily be harmonized with the actual effect of a freeze of a for-
eign defendant's assets, 2 " such a relaxed standard is more ap-
propriate for deciding whether to impose an asset freeze in a
civil enforcement action. Given the fact that the SEC must bring
insider trading actions against foreign traders as quickly as pos-
sible - often without having the time or the ability to even dis-
cover the actual identities of the traders - such a standard is
necessary to ensure that the SEC can continue to bring such ac-
tions. However, since the freeze will only be imposed for a "brief
interval" in many cases, the SEC may have to be more selective
in choosing which probable violations to pursue.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is quite likely that the' Unifund decision will limit the
SEC's ability to' enforce United States insider trading laws
against foreign investors. While this Comment does not find
fault with the SEC for aggressively pursuing possible instances
126. SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028, 1042 (2d Cir. 1990). Therefore, the court
appeared to have left it up to the district courts to allow an asset freeze for a longer
period of time where the SEC has made a more substantial showing on the merits than
the "meager" showing of the SEC in Unifund. Id.
127. Id. at 1041.
128. See supra notes 34-52 and accompanying text (Section II.B).
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of offshore fraud, and recognizes the practical obstacles that the
SEC faces in conducting discovery and enforcing judgments
overseas, the courts should not go beyond the basic principles of
equity and fairness to litigants in helping the SEC surmount
those obstacles. Rather than allowing the use of the ancillary
remedy of an asset freeze as a club against foreign defendants in
insider trading actions, the courts should force the SEC to seek
a more permanent and more sound solution to their practical
problems.129
Such a solution may be forthcoming as a result of the SEC's
continued efforts to negotiate more and better structured MOUs
and mutual legal assistance treaties.130 However, if the time
needed to conduct discovery under such treaties cannot be
shortened significantly, the SEC may need to push hard for in-
ternational agreements on improving the procedure for recogni-
tion of foreign judgments, 3' lest future foreign defendants are
able to outlast foreshortened freeze orders and default.
Michael T. Prior
129. With respect to insider trading violations, it is unclear at this time whether the
SEC will be able to employ its cease and desist power under the recent Securities Law
Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, re-
printed in FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) No. 1416, pt. HI (Oct. 10, 1990), to impose asset
freezes and, ultimately, orders of disgorgement. See Abramowitz, From Regulation to
Punishment: New SEC Power, N.Y.L.J. Nov. 6, 1990 at 3.
130. See Mann & Mari, supra note 12, at 925-26.
Congress greatly enhanced the SEC's ability to negotiate reciprocal assistance agree-
ments such as MOUs with other countries by passing the International Securities En-
forcement Cooperation Act of 1990 (the Act). Pub. L. No. 101-550, reprinted in FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) No. 1422, pt. H (Nov. 21, 1990). The Act improved the ability of the
SEC to provide foreign authorities with confidential information, preserved the confiden-
tiality of evidence received by the SEC from foreign authorities - by exempting such
evidence from the Freedom of Information Act - and made clear that the SEC and the
self-regulatory organizations (the various securities exchanges and the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers) had the authority to bar or suspend securities professionals on
the basis of the findings of foreign authorities or courts. Id. The Act should enhance the
SEC's bargaining position in negotiating mutual assistance treaties, therefore, since the
SEC's ability to provide a foreign authority with meaningful assistance in the United
States is greatly improved by its provisions.
131. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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